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C.: Workmen's Compensation--Permanent Total Disability Fating--Effect

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

If, under the West Virginia statute, the requirement as to time for
filing is mandatory and jurisdictional even in the presence of
fraud, the claimant would be deprived of his right to compensation
and be left to an uncertain action against his employer. It is submitted that this possibility should be prevented by a statutory provision allowing additional time for filing, if, due to false representations of the employer, the employee should not file his claim
within the six months' period. Such a proviso would eliminate
all benefits arising from the fraud, and secure to the employee his
right to compensation.
A. A. A.
WORKxMN'S COMPENSATION RATING -

PERMAENT TOTAL DISABILITY

EFFECT OF RETURING TO WORK. -

The claimant suf-

fered an injury to his right leg necessitating amputation aliout two
inches above the knee. Afterwards osteomyelitis developed in the
remaining portion of the right thigh and spread to the left forearm, requiring bone surgery which resulted in permanent deformity of the left forearm and wrist. The medical evidence proved
conclusively that the claimant had little use of his left 'arm; that
a slight bruise or strain thereto would probably bring about a
recurrence of the osteomyelitis; that the condition of the arm is
such that the serious reappearance of this affection would necessitate surgical treatment, perhaps to the extent of amputation, and
there would be a strong likelihood that osteomyelitis would spread
to other members of the body. It was contended that a permanent
total disability award should not be granted as the claimant had
returned to work in the employer's lamp house and was receiving
wages. Held, that this employee's right to compensation on a
permanent total disability rating was not defeated by his returning to work and receiving wages. Gay Coal & Coke Co. V. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.'
Disability results from the loss of parts of the body or the
efficient use thereof. 2 The purpose of the act is to compensate the
employee for the impairment of his physical efficiency,' and in
determining the percentage of present disability the claimant's
the liability, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the
right to sue at all."
Keser v. U. S. S. Lead Refinery, 88 Ind. App. 246, 163
N. E. 621 (1928).
12 S. E. (2d) 265 (W. Va. 1939).
2Johnson v. Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 316, 154 S. E. 766 (1930);
2 SCoNEIDE, WoRmEN'S COmPENSATON (2d ed. 1932) 1341.
3 Ashworth v. Compensation ComIm'r, 117 W. Va. 73, 183 S. E. 912 (1936).
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future ability to work must be considered. 4 This being so, does it
not follow that where an injured employee has sustained a distinct
loss of earning power in the near or remote future, he should receive compensation for that, even though at the present he has returned to work and is receiving wages ?'
Under the compensation act to obtain a rehearing to get an
award reduced there must be shown conditions which had not been
considered by the commissioner when the former award was made,(
i. e., a reduction in the employee's disability. The fact that an
injured employee has returned to work and is receiving wages is
no sign that the disability has been reduced, but is only some evidence of a change in the employee's condition, not of itself sufficient to justify a change in the award made.7
The courts should construe the term "disability" liberally,
for a narrow construction of it would encourage idleness on the
part of injured employees and would discourage them from making efforts to help themselves for fear that any activity by them
might furnish evidence against their right to compensation which
the law has provided for them.8 By the term "permanent total
disability", it seems the drafters of the act did not intend to require the injured employees to remain inactive and inert to avoid
imperiling their right to compensation. The courts in determining
the percentage of disability have recognized the fact that a laborer
in an endeavor adequately to provide for his family may earn wages
for a time after the injury as he did before, but that in due time the
injury will exact its toll.' Usually these jobs are given to dis4 McCormick S. S. Co. v. United States E. C. Comm'r, 64 F. (2d) 84 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1933); Roller v. Warren, 98 Vt. 514, 129 Atl. 168 (1925); Johnson v.
Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 316, 154 S. E. 766 (1930).
r, Mercury Aviation Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 186 Cal. 375, 199 Pac.
508 (1921); Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. 509, 145 N. E. 643
(2924); Gley v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 98 Kan. 53, 157 Pac. 431 (1916);
Clark's Case, 120 Me. 133, 113 AtI. 51 (1921).
6 Igo v. Compensation Comn'r, 112 W. Va. 595, 166 S. E. 8 (1932); Phillips
v. Compensation Comm'r, 114 W. Va. 648, 174 S. E. 561 (1934).
7Consolidated Coal v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. 526, 145 N. E. 675 (1924);
Septimo's Case, 219 Mass. 430, 107 N. E. 63 (1914); Kinyon v. Kinyon, 230
Mo. App. 623, 71 S. W. (2d) 78 (1934); Superior Smokeless Coal & Mining
Co. v. Bishop, 85 Okla. 204, 205 P. (2d) 909 (1933); Ashworth v. Compensation
Comm'r, 117 W. Va. 73, 183 S. E. 912 (1936).
8 Kinyon v. Kinyon, 230 Mo. App. 623, 71 S. W. (2d) 78 (1934).
9 Dennis v. Cafferty, 99 Kan. 810, 163 Pac. 461 (1917); Henry Tidd Const.
Co. v. Mead, 163 Okla. 64, 20 P. (2d). 909 (1933); Johnson v. Compensation
Comm 'r, 109 W. Va. 316, 154 S. E. 766 (1930).
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abled employees as acts of charity or sympathy and not due to
actual capacity to do the work."
Assuming the award were reduced to a permanent partial
disability rating of eighty-five percent or less, under the compensation act such claim could not be reopened after the expiration of
one year from the date of the last payment thereunder." In such
cases the employer, if wages alone were indicative of the degree of
disability, could provide work for the injured employee, who could
riot secure employment elsewhere, and pay more than his services
are worth, later to dispense with his services after the year from the
time of the last payment of compensation. 2 Thus the injured employee would be in the future without compensation and without
tin opportunity of securing work, for due to his disability no one
would hire him.' 3 Such employee would then become a public
charge, unless lie had other sources of income, a contingency against
which it was the purpose of the compensation act to guard. 4

W. J. C.
10 Hulo v. N w Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923); Roller v. Warren,

98 Vt. 514, 129 Atl. 168 (1925); of. McDaniel v. Compensation Appeal Board,
118 W. Va. 596, 601, 191 S. E. 362 (1937) holding: "The fact that he might
get occasional and rare work at lighter employment which he could discharge,
or that through some special arrangement such work may be made temporarily
available to this one individual, does not prevent him from receiving a
permanent and total disability rating. But the fact that he could do light
remunerative work that was ordinarily available to a person in his situation,
would prevent him from receiving a total and permanent disability rating."
(The court in the instant case found that the employee was permanently and
totally disabled by this standard.) Johnson v. Compensation Comm'r, 109
W. Va. 316, 321, 154 S. E. 766, 768 (1930) held: "I'In ascertaining the degree
of physical impairment, the occupation to be considered in making a disability
rating, is usually that at which the employee was engaged at the time of the
injury."
(In the principal case the claimant was totally and permanently
disabled by this test too.)
11W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 16: ......
that no further
award may be made ....
in cases of non-fatal injuries, except ....
within

one year after the commissioner shall have made the last payment in any
permanent disability case."
As to a permanent total disability this problem
does not arise, as compensation is paid the rest of the employee's life. Id. at 6:
"For a disability from eighty-five to one hundred per cent, sixty-six and twothirds of the average weekly earnings during the remainder of life." Under
the same section for a disability of eighty-five per cent or less payments expire
after they have been made for a designated number of weeks.
12 Gailey v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 98 Kan. 53, 157 Pac. 431 (1916) ; Johnson
v. Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 316, 154 S. E. 766 (1930).
is Kinyon v. Kinyon, 230 Mo. App. 623, 71 S. W. (2d) 78 (1934).
14Ferrel v. Compensation Comm'r, 108 W. Va. 477, 172 S. E. 609 (1930).
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